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Jenkins: The Corps of Guides, 1903–1914

Little Known Canadian Units

The Corps of Guides,
1903-1914
Dan R. Jenkins

'T"he Canadian Corps of Guides was created in
~ April 1903 by General Order 61 , and fell
under the purview of the Intelligence Department
at Militia Headquarters in Ottawa. However, as
the Guides were a service of the Active Militia,
and not of the Permanent Force, they were not a
full-time formation. The Corps was designed to
fulfil both a peacetime and wartime role. During
active operations it was to act as a combat
intelligence force for Canadian armies in the field,
and provide commanders with operational and
tactical level intelligence. During peacetime it was
to prepare for this eventuality, but more
importantly, it was to help accumulate intelligence
on Canada's military resources and capabilities,
as well as on those offoreign powers, in particular
the United States. As with all of Canada's
peacetime military establishments, the Guides
suffered from underfunding, understaffing and
undertraining. Nevertheless, the Corps of Guides
was still able to provide a valuable service in the
years leading up to the First World War, and
offered its members a background in Intelligence
that would prove indispensable in that war. 1
Canada's experience in the Boer War had
much to do with the creation of the Corps of
Guides. In the South Afrtcan War, Canadians saw
first-hand the value of Scouts and scouting. Many,
including General Dundonald, the General Officer
Commanding the Canadian Militia, believed that
a mounted scouting force would prove valuable
in Canada, a country similar to SouthMrica, with
wide open and sparsely populated spaces. As the
1904 Militia Report stated:

88

Valuable as such a corps proved in Natal during
the South African war, its value to a country such
as Canada can hardly be over-estimated. It not
only forms an indispensable adjunct to an
Intelligence Department, but it enables Canada
to be covered by a network of capable officers,
trained durtng peace in their special duties, and
who would be invaluable to a General in the field
from their knowledge of every part of the
country. 2

The Corps of Guides then, was designed very
much as a force for use in Canada.
One of the objectives of the Intelligence
Department was to make available to officers
commanding field forces military intelligence
pertinent to their commands. The Department
was also charged with gathering information on
the military resources of the British Empire and
foreign powers, although efforts and results in
this regard were meagre. Lieutenant-Colonel
Denny, Director oflntelligence in 1903, stated in
a letter to the District Intelligence Officers (DIOs),
that information on Canada "should be as far
reaching as possible," and he asked that DIOs
send in clippings from newspapers and other
sources on a monthly basis regarding any material
of a military character, including information on
the "movements of high USA Officials, troops, etc."
All data collected would then be collated and
indexed, and form the basis of the monthly
Intelligence Diary. 3
The accumulation of information on the
military resources of Canada proceeded diligently.
In 1903 Canada was still very much an unknown
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and unexplored country, whose military resources
were often a mystery to military planners in both
Ottawa and London. The country had not yet been
fully surveyed. The resource potential, including
natural resources and regional and local
manufacturing output, was unknown, and the
country had yet to be mapped on a scale suitable
for military use. The Intelligence Department's
mandate was to correct these shortfalls so that
military planners would at least know the country
better than any potential enemies (read USA). It
was the role of the Corps of Guides to help in the
collection of this information. As General
Dundonald stated in 1903:
Canada is now being covered by a network of
intelligent and capable men, who will be of great
service to the country in collecting information
of a military character and in fitting themselves
to act as guides in their own [military] districts
to the forces in the field ... Nobody is admitted
into this Corps unless he is a man whose services
are likely to be of real use to the country.•

In order to systematically gather intelligence
on Canada's resources, the Guides' organization
was designed to fit the pre-existing system of
Military Districts. Each District was given its own
District Intelligence Officer. The DIO was to
oversee the entire collection process for the
district, collect all intelligence reports and maps
and forward them to the Intelligence Department
in Ottawa. He was to advise the District
Commander on intelligence matters, and be able
to address any question regarding military
intelligence for his district. 5 "Officers receiving the
appointment of D. I. 0. should be of suitable spirit
and one who would take a keen interest in his
work." A military background was not a
prerequisite- in fact, civil engineers, and land
surveyors "or one connected with these
professions would be preferable." Although those
selected would also require "a general knowledge
of military topography and reconnaissance duties,
and to be acquainted with the geography of his
District." In addition, it would be helpful if
potential DIOs knew the "resources of [their]
district" in terms of"produce, horses, cattle, and
transportation," so that they could check for
accuracy the work of those under their
command. 6
Districts were further subdivided into SubDistricts, and commanded by Sub-District
Intelligence Officers (SDIOs). These officers were

responsible for commanding the Guides in their
respective Sub-Districts, collecting Guide reports,
and gathering information from other sources,
in addition to their own reconnaissances. They
were to record all information onto sketch maps
provided to them for this purpose. If called upon,
SDIOs were to be able to answer any question of
an intelligence nature regarding their sub-district,
just as DIOs and Guides were expected to be able
to do in their respective jurisdictions. 7 Again,
military experience was not considered necessary
for the job. "If an officer can be appointed with
some knowledge of military topography and
reconnaissance work, so much the better, but the
lack of these qualifications will not be counted
when a man is keen and will take an interest in
his work." Civil engineers and land surveyors were
again the first choice. In any event, all those
selected for the position would preferably have a
profession or occupation that permitted them to
travel about their sub-district and the country
side regularly, to permit some familiarity with the
residents. 8
Sub-Districts were divided into Guide Areas
in which specially qualified men with a knowledge
of the local area were to be appointed as Guides.
Guides were to do most of the ground work. They
were to be intelligent and capable men with a
thorough knowledge of the topography and
resources in their respective area. They were
supposed to be intimately familiar with such
features as road and rail networks, water routes,
telegraph and telephone lines, and pathways. As
well, Guides were expected to be acquainted with
the farmers and important towns' people in the
area. If possible, Guides were to have a horse indeed, it is difficult to see how they could do
their job without one. All in all, the standards
demanded were high:
Too much stress cannot be laid on the necessity
for careful selection of Guides. The best class of
man would be one who is of sufficient position
and intelligence to be an officer in the Corps,
but who, not willing to accept an officer's
responsibility, might join as a Guide.

The Intelligence Department recognized that this
class of men would be a rare find and told the
SDIOs, who were responsible for selecting Guides,
to do the best they could with the material at hand.
The pay certainly would not attract good men.
On the contrary, it was "presumed that those who
join the Guides will do so from patriotic motives
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Offtcers of the Canadian Corps of Guides, Cobourg, Ontario, 1906.
(E.L.M. Burns Collection. NAC PA 113014)

and from interest in a Corps the novelty of which
cannot fail to appeal to those who desire
something more than mere "Drill" soldiering. "9
This point, however, is moot, as the Corps did
not recruit Guides until 1912. Headquarters felt
it was best to train officers in their intelligence
duties before selecting Guides, as Guides were to
be trained by the Corps' officers. 10

is a principle which is capable of extension. "13
Every year more useful military information was
being gathered, tabulated and distributed in the
form of an Intelligence Diary to those who could
use it. 14 And every year more officers were
becoming proficient in their duties, with the
Eastern Commands generally performing ahead
of their counterparts in Western Canada. 15

Before the First World War, the annual Militia
Reports, on the whole, looked favourably on the
Corps of Guides. To cite two examples: the Militia
Report for the year ending 31 December 1905,

In reality there were shortfalls. Training in
the Corps proceeded sporadically. During
peacetime the Corps' officers- the DIOs and the
SDIOs - were scattered all over Canada on
intelligence gathering duties with little
opportunity, apart from the annual training
camps, to meet and train together. It was
recommended that SDIOs arrange for themselves
and their Guides to join local rifle clubs to gain
some musketry practice. The First World War
quickly proved that much of the limited training
received was insufficient, and for the wrong war.
Prewar tactical exercises were reminiscent of Boer
War methods, and did not anticipate the
conditions in Flanders. One training camp per
year was often all the field training the officers in
the Corps received. These camps were usually
about 12 days long, and provided training in map
reading, military topography, equitation, report
writing, field sketching, and military organization

stated that "the duties of this corps are varied,
and while only organized two years ago, excellent
and useful work is being done by them in matters
of surveying and furnishing valuable
information." 11 For the year ending 31 March
1909, the Militia Report was equally positive.
"Thanks are due to the officers of the Corps of
Guides for the willing assistance they rendered
during the year in collecting and communicating
intelligence. The reports which they send in are
always useful, sometimes very valuable. "12 Sir
John French's 1910 report on the state of the
Canadian Militia also viewed the Corps of Guides
in a positive light. "I regard the establishment of
the Corps of Guides," he wrote, "as being a most
valuable and useful adjunct to the staff. I think it
90
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and administration. 16 Guide officers spent most
of their time at these camps training in practical
field work instead of drill, as their role in time of
war would be specialized intelligence work that
did not require the traditional skills of the other
arms.
Rifle
shooting,
military sketching,
reconnaissance reports, and a general
knowledge of the formation and composition of
our own forces and those of the U.S. are about
all the principal items which members of the
Corps should study. There is generally speaking
no knowledge of actual drill required, though
every member of the Corps must be able to ride
[a horse]. 17

The officers attending training camps were usually
enthusiastic, but 12 days training could not
produce an efficient Intelligence Service.
Officers were also required to pass a series
of examinations before being fully accepted into
the Corps. Generally speaking, examinations
consisted of three written tests, practical field
work, and equitation. The three written tests were
each between two and three hours long. One
examination usually dealt with the duties of
Intelligence Officers in war and peace. With this
test officers were examined on their
understanding of their duties, reconnoitring
patrols, definitions of military terms, the various
types of information collected by Intelligence
Officers, and the means by which it is transmitted
to headquarters. One of the questions from the
1911 examination, for instance, was a follows:
In order to be prepared for war, it is necessary
to collect and tabulate Intelligence in Peace time.
Under what main headings may information
collected in time of peace be said to fall; state
briefly the sources from which the military
operations Directorate derives the above
informat!on? 18

Only one candidate answered this question well,
according to the examiner's remarks. The
majority did not understand it, and offered vague
answers as a result.
A second written test was concemed with
military mapping and sketching. Officers were
expected to demonstrate their level of skill in
reading contour maps, map making, military
sketching, and compass work. The 1911

examination provides another example of a
question asked.
Mark on the diagram with a black line what you
consider to be the shortest route by which you
could proceed from the point ·A" [marked on
the map supplied] to the point "B" without being
seen by a man at the point "D" (the height of the
man and your own height may be taken as equal
and omitted from the calculations). 19

All those taking the test showed "a general idea
of what is required [in answering this question],
but the route chosen was by no means the shortest
- in only one instance was any reason given for
the route taken."
The final written examination normally
focused on organization and administrative
functions. Candidates were expected to be
familiar with the organization of the Canadian
Militia, the Corps of Guides, and have some
understanding of the organization of US military
forces. They were also to know which Staff
Officers were responsible for what duties, in
addition to other training and administrative
details. 20
Written examinations were, of course, useful
as a means for determining where more work and
study was required. The June and July
examination of 1907, for example, revealed that
officers did not seem to know when
reconnaissance reports were to be written. In fact,
the test scores on the whole were not as good as
1906. In 1908 the matter of when to write
reconnaissance reports had not been cleared up,
as the question dealing with reconnaissance was
"Not well answered." Indeed, "It was noticed that
some officers are not clear as to when
reconnaissance reports are to be written or the
methods of carrying out reconnaissance." 21
Obviously one of the most importance
responsibilities of the Corps of Guides was below
standard.
With the practical application test officers
were examined on their field work abilities. In
1911, for example, officers were given two hours
to map three miles of road without instruments,
and on a scale of three inches to the mile. In
addition, they were to make notes on the tactical
features of the ground on both sides of the road
to a depth of 1,000 yards. 22 This test clearly called
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for a skilled officer with a trained eye, qualities
of enormous value in an Intelligence Officer.
Equitation, of course, tested an officer's
horsemanship. Any drill that was required would
follow the cavalry manual. Although "officers will
not be expected to perfect themselves in details,
[so) long as they know sufficient to enable them
to march troops on and off parade for inspectional
purposes. "23
British Field manuals were the main source
to which officers looked to find what skills were
required. Colonel David Henderson's Art of
Reconnaissance was also recommended, as was
his Field Intelligence: Its Principles and
Practices. Captain C.F. Vander-Boyle's Practical
Scout Train was on the reading list as well.
Examinations were based on these and other
sources.
Officers without previous military experience
were appointed to the Guides on a provisional
basis, and given one year to pass the Corps of
Guides' examinations, and to obtain a subaltern

certificate in either one of the cavalry, infantry or
artillery services. Those with previous militia
experience also had to pass all examinations, and
bear a certification of rank in one of the three
arms. Officers with two years' experience in the
regular army, or the Canadian or some other
Dominion's permanent force, had only to pass
the third examination- equitation- unless his
previous experience was in a mounted service. 24
Reconnaissance rides were also used in
training. Once a year some of the Corps' officers
would take ten to 12 days and ride from one
predetermined location to another and make
notes, maps and sketches on everything of a
military nature. In 1909, for instance, one troop
of officers left Kingston and rode to Petawawa.
Included in their kit was a prismatic compass,
protractor, note book, field glasses, and sketching
materials. Their job was to take notes and make
sketches on the condition of roads, railways,
water routes and so forth, so as to practice their
mapping and intelligence gathering skills. 25

Officers of the Canadian Corps of Guides, Niagara-on-the-Lake. Captain Lawrence H. Sitwell is at the
extreme left.

(Lawrence Hurt Sitwell Collection, NAC PA 111891)

92

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1996

5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 5 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 11

Lectures given at local armouries presented
another avenue for Guide officers to hone their
trade. For example, Captain Lawrence Sitwell gave
a lecture in March 1909 entitled "A Scout is born
-not made, but much that is lacking in birth may
be made up for by careful training." In it he
outlined his views of what a Scout's duties
entailed, and offered suggestions on how to
sharpen one's scouting acumen. "A Scouts [sic]
duties render it almost imperative," he wrote,
"that he be imbued with sporting instincts; he
must understand nature in its fullest sense,
natural history, birds, wild animals and insects."
It is the Scout's duty to "see without being seen."
He told his audience that if they could outwit "an
ordinary wild bird or animal" that they were "on
the first rung of the ladder of success as a Scout,"
for outwitting nature is no easy feat. He believed
that Scouts required special training to perform
their tasks, especially in night-time operations.
Sitwell asked his listeners to practice constantly
their tracking and observation skills, and offered
practical advice on how to perfect these skills.
Scouts, he said, should learn the sounds of nature
at rest so that when on outpost duty they would
recognize changes. "Throw a stone into a Swamp
and the croaking instantly ceases. It is by means
of sounds like these ... that enables a scout or a
man on outpost duty... to tell whether his point or
flank is in a state of rest and quiet and that no
movement of the enemy is taking place in his
immediate neighbourhood." Scouts, he said,
could practice their art when off duty. When
walking follow animal tracks, he suggested, to
improve one's tracking abilities. Those who live
in cities could practice their observation skills
by noting, while walking along the street, what
they see in shop windows. He offered easy
methods to determine direction without a
compass, and to gauge distances with the naked
eye. He pointed out that distant sounds could be
more readily heard if one placed his ear close to
the ground. To hear even farther a Scout should
immerse himself in water, such as a still lake,
pond or river, as sounds travel farther in that
medium. Good Scouts, he offered, should be
willing to make such sacrillces. Moreover, Scouts,
he explained, should also be able to read a map,
although he felt that "As far as our Canadian
Militia is concerned I regret to have to state that
at least 75% of the Officers if given a map would
not understand it any more than a lumber jack
understands Greek." Scouts should possess all
five senses plus the sixth sense "called common

sense or horsesense." He further stated that
Scouts "should understand something about
Signalling. "26 Later that year Sitwell was again
lecturing, but this time on military mapping and
sketching. He was probably heeding his own
words, and was attempting to improve the
performance of the 75 per cent of officers whom
he felt could not read a map.
Guide officers also polished their skills at
annual Corps of Guide Conferences. These
gatherings not only offered an opportunity to
socialize with fellow officers, but a chance to hear
various presentations by one's peers on
Intelligence related matters. At the third annual
conference held in 1909, for instance, topics
discussed included "The Detroit River Tunnel,"
byMajorH.J. Lamb, DIO for Military District#!.
Captain R.R. Barber, of the Corps of Guides,
explained "A system of indexing, recording, and
transmitting information." Major-General Lake
talked about "Reconnaissance in front of an
Army," while Colonel Sam Hughes outlined his
ideas on "The Guide, an asset in Peace and in
War." Attending officers, of course, could take
what they wanted from these conferences, but the
opportunity was there to make connections for
furthering their careers, and to learn more about
their duties as Guide officers. 27
In 1912, the Challenge Cup was introduced
to test the Corps' efficiency. The challenge was
largely one of equitation and compass work.
However, the Challenge Cup was as much a social
event as a test. Officers who asked to participate
in this cross-country horse race paid a five dollar
entry fee for the privilege of being judged on their
speed, jumping ability, pace, and the condition of
their horse at the race's end. Competitors were
allowed a map, compass and a watch with which
to complete the 15 mile race with its six to ten
jumps. Horses with spur marks were
automatically disqualified, as were horses that
did not eat half a feed of oats within one hour of
completing the race. 28 Intelligence skills called for
in the First World War were obviously lacking in
this challenge. Indeed, intelligence skills in general
were neither strenuously tested nor
demonstrated.
Training in the Corps was severely
handicapped by the fact that until 1912 it
contained no Guides. The Corps of Guides was
largely a Corps of officers. There were Guides
93
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listed as present at annual camps before this date,
but in reality they were the officers' grooms and
batmen, not Guides. 29 During the first years of
the Corps' existence, the officer commanding the
Corps believed that one Guide per township was
plenty during wartime, and should be restricted
to "the least possible number" during peace.
It cannot be impressed too firmly on all officers
that Intelligence work. .. will form the chief and
main work of the Corps for some years. It will
be absolutely impossible and unnecessary even
to form companies of guides; the object of the
Corps is lost in formations of this kind. 30

In this case, the least possible number equalled
zero. Nevertheless, when the time came every
Guide - although none were being trained -was
expected to "be able to think for and look after
himself and his horse, and be dependent on no
one, but rather seek that others should be
dependent on him"31
By 1907 there were calls to reverse this
situation. Major E.T.P. Shewen, of the Corps of
Guides based in New Brunswick, explained his
position forcefully in a letter to headquarters
requesting 32 Guides.
I am very much in earnest about this matter. We
have long been held up to ridicule, as being a
regiment of officers without men. I can assure
you, speaking as a civil engineer, it is impossible
to do without men if you want to get any work
accomplished.

He further went on to say:
It is absurd to suppose that five officers, in a

military district comprehending 28,000 square
miles, could, in time of war, conduct an effective,
local. intelligence service, that is to say, one that
could furnish information of an enemy's
approach, open or disguised, by sea or land. It
would be equally unreasonable to assume that
In event of a crisis, men, picked up at a moment's
notice, would prove efficient scouts ... or would
be able to satisfactorily perform the important
duty of keeping a look-out, exercising judgment
and giving notice, by wire, to the nearest officer
commanding, if occasion required. 32

Finally, in 1912 a company of mounted
Guides was organized and trained. This gave
officers of the Corps their first real opportunity
to command a body of troops designed for
battlefield intelligence work. The training of
Guides at the annual camps followed the same

or similar syllabus as that offered to officers. The
training syllabus for the 1912 camp at Calgary
offers an example. Day one dealt largely with horse
care. Day two focused on map work, conventional
signs and the use of simple scales. On the third
day the officers and men of the Corps worked in
the field and received specific instruction on how
to report on such features as roads, railways,
farms and villages, rivers and enemy positions.
The fourth day saw the Guides practising their
message writing skills, comparing maps to
ground, tracking and making deductions. The
fifth day was a repeat of day three, while the sixth
day concentrated on reconnoitring an enemy
position. Patrol work and the transmission of
messages made up the seventh day's schedule,
while the eighth day was set aside for musketry.
On day nine the men practised reconnoitring an
enemy outpost line "by day with a View to a nearer
approach by night." Day ten was used to repeat
some of the exercises practised earlier. Days
eleven and twelve were for use as the camp
commandant may direct. It was assumed that all
ranks were already proficient riders, so there was
no instruction in equitation. So as not to waste
any time, scouting formations would be practised
as the Guides rode in and out of camp on their
way to and from field training. The objective of
the camp training was to "provide a body of
Officers and men who are skilled in reading a
map and who know what to report and how to
report it, either verbally or in writing. "33
One district did, however, experiment with
Guide officers commanding Scouts before 1912.
During the ThanksgiVing weekend camp in 1911,
Major C.H. Mitchell, the DIO for the Second
DiVisional Area, took part in a tactical exercise in
which Scouts, commanded by Corps of Guide
officers, were employed. 34 The positive
experiences of this camp contributed to the
creation of a company of mounted Guides the
following year. Several lessons were learned at
this camp about the employment and training of
Scouts. It was clear to Mitchell that the time had
come to train an independent body of Scouts
under the Corps' command, as the attitudes and
skill level of some of the men detailed to act as
Scouts from the other serVices were inadequate.
It seemed that commanding officers were
unwilling to part with their best men by handing
them over to Guide officers. It was also apparent
that scouting was specialized work, requiring
specific training not available in the other arms.
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Major A.J. Van Nostrand (left) and Captain C.H. Mitchell, Stanley Barracks, Toronto, Ontario, January 1911.
(Lawrence Hurt Sitwell Collection. NAC PA 111942)

From his experience at this camp, Mitchell also
realized that the transmission of messages called
for some improvement, as important information
sometimes took longer to reach headquarters
than was desired. Intelligence and
communications work go hand-in-hand, and
information would have come in faster, Mitchell
thought, if the cavalry had had a visual signalling
system, a field telephone, and a motorcycle. This
would also save valuable horse flesh. Mitchell's
concerns presaged the Canadian Corps'
experience during the First World War, where
communications and specialized scouting skills
were also of premium value. 35
Other Districts were not as innovative, and
performed below expected standards. For
example, an inspection of Military District #10,
in 1912, revealed that the District Intelligence
Officer had made no compilation of military
intelligence and statistics. Many maps, though,
had been gathered, "but none of a strictly military

character." The sub-districts were also ill defined
and liable to cause confusion, and there was a
considerable shortage of equipment. 36
By 1912, even the normally positive Militia
Reports hinted at imperfections in the Corps.
There was a warning about the importance of
selecting high quality officers for the Corps, for
"in no other branch does "dead wood" so
materially mar efficiency as in the Corps of
Guides." On the other hand, the Militia Report
also stated that officers, "with very few
exceptions," were aware of the "importance and
highly technical cast of their duties." There were
also hints that some ill-feeling towards the Corps
was brewing in the other services. "Hitherto," the
Report reads, "in the eyes of many, little or no
thought has been given to [the Corps'] value and
responsibilities, consequently [the Corps] has
been looked upon as a comfortable refuge for such
as desired rank and uniform without the
attending sacrifices. "37 The Militia Report for the
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year ending 31 March 1913 pointed out that
"Adequate accommodation [was] wanting for such
officers as are specially charged with the care and
compilation of maps and records." Furthermore,
it expressed regret that Royal Military College
graduates who joined the Corps tended to "evade
their obligation as to training, and for this reason
a doubt is created as to whether such a desirable
source can be counted upon to fill vacancies."
There was also difficulty in procuring horses. 38

learn if his letter cleared up the situation to any
great degree. Paley also explained something of
the proposed organization of the Corps in
wartime. The Staff Manual (War), he noted,
expected the Corps of Guides to form part of the
Intelligence Corps under the Commander-inChief. In this capacity Guide officers could be
assigned "multifarious appointments in
connection with Intelligence and Censorship."
However, there was a:

Moreover, as late as 1913, ten years after the
Corps was organized and only one year before
the First World War, there was still some confusion
over the organization and battlefield role the
Guides were to play. The Corps was viewed by
many as a "hybrid" of the three standard services,
without any clear function. This, according to
George Paley, the officer administering the Corps
of Guides in 1913, was understandable as the
Corps did not fit into the "stereotyped
organizations with which [commanders] are
familiar." As it was not until 1912 that Guides
were organized into mounted companies "no clear
ideas ever appear to have been expressed as to
the exact organization, training and employment
in war of the rank and file." The Corps' role was
so misunderstood that Lieutenant-Colonel Paley
felt he had to explain its role in a letter to the
commanding officer of the First Divisional Area.
During wartime, if operating as Divisional
mounted troops:

tendency on the part of some members of the
Corps to think that officers intended for these
appointments, will derive little benefit from the
nature of the training at camp, and that they
should therefore be excused. This is very
erroneous ... [Such a position] would be to
acknowledge that any civilian of good standing
in his business or private profession would be
equally suited, and consequently one of the
strongest arguments for the maintenance of the
Corps of Guides would be removed. 39

the Guides could be of service in the opening of
a campaign in patrolling, scouting, and despatch
riding, whilst, from their local knowledge, they
would come in particularly useful for any
independent reconnaissance.

If nothing else, they could act "as expert despatch

riders and for intercommunication purposes ... a
service the want of which is apparent in every
campaign." Paley also thought that the Guides
would probably "prove of value in making rough
sketches and plans required by the Staff, and in
providing Intelligence Police," and in gathering
"information under cover of the protection
afforded by the troopers, especially so at first
before the cavalry had developed much expertness
in the art of scouting." As well, Guides could be
used to watch all friendly lines of approach and
give early warning of attack. Mter all was said
and done, however, what Paley described sounded
very much like a force of independent, well trained
traditional cavalry, and it would be interesting to

Nonetheless, there were some shining lights
in the Corps. One example was Major C.H.
Mitchell, DIO for District Two. During the Great
War, he would hold in turn the position of General
Staff Officer for Intelligence in the First Canadian
Division, the Canadian Corps, the Second Army
of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and
later, the BEF forces in Italy. In 1911, while still a
captain, he wrote a report entitled "Aerial
Navigation in Warfare." In it he recognized the
important role that aircraft would play in any
future war, and proceeded to describe the type of
craft available to contemporary armies, including
captive balloons, dirigibles and heavier-than-air
ships. He was somewhat futuristic and Orwellian
though, when he declared that
There is no doubt that very shortly a vertical
lifting "heavier than air" machine will be brought
out capable of standing stationary or hovering
over any point; this will probably combine the
horizontal speed properties of the aeroplane.

He saw in the airplane not only intelligence
capabilities such as reconnaissance, but a
screening role whereby enemy planes could be
blocked from viewing friendly forces. Aircraft, he
recognized, would also be valuable in a signalling
and communication role, in directing artillery frre,
strategic bombing, antisubmarine warfare, and
in general land and sea co-operation. He further
saw the airplane as a natural adjunct to the Corps
of Guides, providing a service that Intelligence
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Officers "must early become proficient" with. 40 In
1912, after having been promoted to major, he
composed a paper titled "Intelligence service in
relation to Army Service Corps. His
understanding of intelligence as described in this
report would hold true throughout the First World
War. "It goes without saying," he wrote,
that the better intelligence obtained beforehand
regarding an enemy's country, his resources and
his transportation facilities, as well as of our
own country, the more positively and
consequently the more safely can a plan of
operation be conceived and carried out. The
failure to obtain early information of this nature
was especially apparent in the case of our own
South African War and on the part of the French
in 1870. 41

During the First World War he tried not to make
the same mistake. Mitchell also stressed the need
for co-operation among the various services in
order for Intelligence to provide the best possible
service. This was an attitude he maintained
throughout the war. Mitchell also laid the
groundwork for the Canadian Corps' Intelligence
Service. As such, he can take much of the credit
for its organizational, administrative, and
battlefield success. His achievement in the
Intelligence Corps during the war attests to his
efficiency.
Prior to the war Ottawa periodically
forwarded intelligence gathered on Canada's
military resources to the Colonial Office for use
by the Committee of Imperial Defence. This
surrender of national secrets and military
intelligence clearly demonstrates Canada's
colonial status in relation to Great Britain at the
time. No independent nation would countenance
such actions. The forwarding of intelligence to
Great Britain also suggests that Canada would
not, and could not stand aside if the Empire went
to war. In fact, the Militia Report for the year
ending 31 March 1908, is even more pointed in
this regard.
Special efforts were made to ascertain the
manufacturing capabilities of Canada in respect
to those articles which would be required for
the use and up-keep of an army in the field, not
only for the purposes of the Dominion, but with
a view to acquainting the Imperial authorities
with the material resources upon which the
Empire might reckon in the event of a great
war (emphasis added). 42

When war was declared in August 1914 the
Corps of Guides was not called up to serve
overseas. At least 235 of the 499 members of the
Corps did, however, volunteer for the first
Canadian Contingent; while in British Columbia
various units in Military District #11 were placed
on active service to guard the coast, including the
11th Detachment of the Corps of Guides. This
was "the only Guides unit formally placed on
active service in 1914."43 The British Army, to
which the Canadian Contingent conformed, did
not have on establishment a Guide organization.
As a result, the men of the Canadian Corps of
Guides were distributed throughout the
Contingent in various staff and specialist
functions, some as Intelligence Officers. However
rudimentary their Guide training may have been
before the war, it was still more than the prewar
British Army offered its troops. The regular
British Army was largely without any trained field
Intelligence Officers in August 1914, and sent
untrained men to meet the Germans. Although
the men of the Corps of Guides had, in some ways,
trained for the wrong war, many of the intelligence
skills they possessed were transferable to the mud
of Flanders, and proved a valuable contribution
to the Canadian Corps. The very existence of the
Corps of Guides kept the importance ofbattlefield
intelligence before the eyes of Canadian soldiers
in the years prior to the war, and probably goes a
fair way in explaining why Canadian formations
tended to employ more Staff Officers on
Intelligence duties than did their British
equivalents. 44 And as combat intelligence was
crucial to success in the First World War, it is
probably fair to say that the Corps of Guides
contributed to the success of the Canadian Corps.
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Announcement
A militaria collectors group devoted to the insignia of
peace-keeping missions has been formed. The Peace
Keeping Insignia Collectors Group (PKICG) was
created 21 November I995 and now has members from
Canada, Denmark and the USA.
The focus of this organization is the preservation of items
of militaria worn by the troops participating in peacekeeping missions. This includes the mission insignta,
eg: the standard United Nations arm patch or the NATO
"IFOR" patch, the national insignia of each contingent
and mission-unique items such as metal pocket badges,
flags, T -shirts and other items that are produced.
Subsidiary aims include preserving these items for the
military history of each participating country and to
further the understanding of peace-keeping to the
citizens of the world through displays and presentations.

For more information, please contact:
Douglas Townend
1758 Harvest Crescent
Orleans, Ontario, Canada KIC I V4
Phone(613)837-1916
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